Case Analysis (ASCI 638, 9.7)

According to the Ashford University College Writing Guide (2013) a "case study analysis requires you to investigate a business problem, examine the alternative solutions, and propose the most effective solution using supporting evidence." It's one of many problem-solving tools, and allows someone to break a complex problem down into smaller pieces that are easier to solve. While I have never crafted an case analysis paper in any professional setting, I have sometimes used the basic idea to write short documents on potential/recommended courses of action. It's certainly a good academic exercise. Something I've used more often is the cost-benefit analysis, which is basically a numerical version of a case analysis. One recommendation that I would make for this, and all assignments, is to drop the APA format requirement. While I supposed it's good to have some formatting guidelines for ease of grading, the emphasis of the projects should be on technical content and the writer's ability to make an effective presentation. Engineering fields do not use the APA style guide, instead choosing much simpler corporate or journal-specific formatting guides, with an emphasis on customer readability. I would recommend using a simplified format, such as the one provided by the American Institute for Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA). Given that I usually prioritize formatting last when completing my assignments with a packed work schedule, I'm appreciative of the instructors who have rewarded the technical effort.


Ashford University. (2013). College Writing Guide. Retrieved from https://awc.ashford.edu/tocw-guidelines-for-writing-a-case-study.html

Human Factors, Ethics and Morality (ASCI 638, 9.4)

This short essay will review some of the leading human factors, ethical and moral considerations for employing Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) in a combat role, and compare and contrast them to manned aircraft. The topics are complex and any one of these areas is worthy of a dissertation.

Human Factors

Like any other complex mission for UAS, remote warfare is limited by the system’s ability to provide enough information in the Ground Control Station (GCS) for the pilot to decisions. The military UAS pilot is challenged to maintain situational awareness of the battlefield due to narrow fields of view, lack of non-visual sensory inputs, and poorly designed interfaces that invite mistakes (Cooke, Pringle, Pedersen, Connor, & Salas, 2006). The lack of human-centric GCS design in tactical UAS can potentially be traced to the origins of the companies that built them, and the speed at which the military acquired them. In the case of the MQ-1 Predator, General Atomics did not have significant experience in building aircraft or cockpits (Whittle, 2015). Combined with the Air Force’s explosive demand for Full-Motion Video (FMV) at the start of the “War on Terror,” the result was a GCS frozen in a highly developmental, non-standard state. While significant research has been accomplished over the past two decades to improve visual displays, and add aural and haptic displays, a materiel solution has yet to be fielded.

Ethics and Morals of Remote Warfare

According to EthicsDefined.org, morals are the “sense of right and wrong” that are culturally or religiously motivated (2016). In some populations, the idea that only one side of an armed conflict can hold the other at risk may be immoral, and Freidberger, (2013) has suggested that this idea has caused outrage against “drone strikes” among people in Afghanistan and Iraq. As reinforcement he cites a statement by former Army General Stanley McChrystal that unmanned strikes are “hated on a visceral level,” but is this necessarily tied to the unmanned aspect. Armed UAS provide unparalleled persistent surveillance with the ability to strike as soon as soon as a targeting opportunity arises, which has likely resulted in more attempted strikes during the Global War on Terror. However, if a platform had been designed that enabled the same capability, plus 24 hours of life support for a crew and countermeasure systems, how would the results be different? America is still holding the enemy at risk without significant threats to safety. Ethics are timeless rules that are essentially recognized by all, which Freidberger investigates using the Just War theory. In doing this, he takes issue with President Obama’s justification for the use of force and illuminates the real heart of the issue. Since Global War on Terror strike justifications, rules of engagement, and combat UAS were all fielded at approximately the same time, many people group them together and see UAS negatively. Further, when people are ignorant to the technical aspects of UAS, and do not research the matter, they arrive at unreasonable conclusions. For example, O’Connell (2010) references a “computer” that tells UAS crews when a weapon has just been fired, and they employ weapons solely on that assessment. She is likely referring to the infrared signature of a hot rifle, which when combined with a crew member’s personal experience and training, results in the correct assessment that the rifle was recently fired. This is no different from an observation made with an infrared sensor on a guard tower, tank, or manned aircraft. What many articles against “remote warfare” consider is that the UAS is a natural continuance of humans creating weapons with more standoff, much like the spear, catapult, and cruise missile.

Conclusion

This essay has skimmed the wave tops of the controversial issue of armed UAS. Several human factors issues were highlighted, showing that there is significant room for improvement. On the non-technical side, the ethical and moral implications of armed UAS were investigated, and found to be dependent on the culture and laws of the using nation.

References

Cooke, N., Pringle, H., Pedersen, H., Connor, O., & Salas, E. (2006). Human Factors of Remotely Operated Vehicles. Advances in Human Performance and Cognitive Engineering Research Human Factors of Remotely Operated Vehicles, 7, 1-1. doi:10.1016/s1479-3601(05)07031-1

Ethicsdefined.org. (2014, March 14). Morals vs. Ethics. Retrieved from http://www.ethicsdefined.org/what-is-ethics/morals-vs-ethics/

Freiberger, E. (2013). Just War Theory and the Ethics of Drone Warfare. Retrieved from http://www.e-ir.info/2013/07/18/just-war-theory-and-the-ethics-of-drone-warfare/

Whittle, R. (2015). Predator: The Secret Origins of the Drone Revolution. New York: Picador USA.

UAS Crew Member Selection (ASCI 638, 8.4)

This short essay will analyze a hypothetical situation where a Boeing-Insitu ScanEagle and a General Atomics Predator B modified by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) known as the Ikhana, are to be used for oceanic environmental studies by a private commercial entity. The 40lb DoD Group 3 ScanEagle (Insitu, 2017) will be flown via line-of-sight (LOS) control to a range of approximately 200NM. The Group 5 Ikhana maximum takeoff weight is 10,500lbs (General Atomics, 2014) and will be flown with SATCOM beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) datalinks to approximately 1000NM from the coast. Crew complement, qualifications, and training need to be determined for sustained operations.

Crew Member Quantity and Qualities

Since the ScanEagle weighs less than 55lbs, and will not be used for recreational or hobby purposes, its use will be in accordance with Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 107, Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Federal Aviation Administration, 2016). A key provision of Part 107 is the Certificate of Authorization/Waiver (COA) process, which will be required to fly beyond visual range, above 400ft, and during hours of darkness if required. The operator bears the burden of demonstrating acceptable risk mitigation strategies in the COA application, one of which should be full compliance with pilot certification requirements. For the ScanEagle, pilots will need to posses a remote pilot certificate with sUAS endorsement. These are obtained by demonstrating acceptable aeronautical knowledge, defined in Paragraph 107.63, and allow Part 61 certificate holders to use an expedited process. The author recommends hiring an initial cadre of pilots that hold a Part 61 and Remote Pilot certificates, and have prior ScanEagle experience, who can train additional employees.

MQ-9 operations will require a longer, specialized approval process, as there is not sufficient regulations in place for National Airspace System (NAS) integration. Since the MQ-9 is well over 55lbs, standing regulations require airworthiness certificates and registration, certificated pilots, and an concept of operations that complies with Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs)(FAA, 2017). Requesting relief from federal regulations typically requires legislative approval, however in Section 333 of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 Congress delegated authority to waive some FAR requirements specifically related to UAS to the Secretary of Transportation. While the ocean survey company could  potentially ask for pilot certification requirements to be waived, it is recommended to hire instrument rated commercial pilots, reducing the amount of requested exemptions and hopefully, the approval timeline. For all “333 exemptions,” the company will need to specify exactly which FARs they need waived, and document an alternative process that will ensure an equivalent level of safety. After approval, which can take roughly 12 months, the company will need to ensure certified pilots are at the controls, and trained on the specific COA restrictions. In military and border patrol operations, the MQ-9 has a dedicated pilot and sensor operator. Since the FAA does not mandate UAS crew compliment, the company will need to show that survey operations can be safely performed by only a pilot, for example with automated payloads and post-flight analysis, or add a sensor operator. Additional information on the data collection and analysis process will be required to make a final determination. 

Hiring Replacements

For basic ScanEagle pilot recruitment, the company can accept applicants with no prior aviation experience, train them, and perhaps pay for Remote Pilot certificates. Part 107 allows non-certified pilots to be at the controls of the UAS, provided they are directly supervised by a certificate holder that has immediate access to the flight controls. Objective pilot candidates should posses Part 61 and 107 certificates, and have prior UAS experience. A “chief ScanEagle pilot” position is also recommended, with the extra requirement for a commercial pilot certificate. This individual will develop best practices for the ocean surveys that will.

MQ-9 pilots will need to meet all of the currency requirements of regular instrument rated commercial pilots, until the 333 exemption process is replaced with a FAR for large UAS. This will require the company to budget and schedule for aircraft rental and currency flights. As a means of reducing that burden, the 333 exemption could be modified, requesting additional relief by allowing non-certificated pilots to conduct the ocean survey mission after completing an organic training program. Given the size of the MQ-9, and the fact that it will need to transit controlled airspace to/from the mission area, waiver of pilot certification requirements is unlikely.

Conclusion

This short essay has investigated the certification, qualification, and training processes that will be required to comply with FARs in conducting a proposed UAS ocean survey mission. Developing a ScanEagle pilot team was found to be relatively easy thanks to the recent activation of 14 CFR Part 107. MQ-9 Ikhana operations are still subject to traditional FARs unless granted a 333 Exemption and COA, which requires significant documentation, lead time, and currency resources.

References

Federal Aviation Administration. (2017). Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Section 333. Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/uas/beyond_the_basics/section_333/

General Atomics - Aeronautical Systems Incorporated. (2014). Predator B RPA Product Data Card. Retrieved from http://www.ga-asi.com/predator-b

Insitu. (2017). ScanEagle Product Data Card. Retrieved from https://insitu.com/images/uploads/pdfs/ScanEagle_SubFolder_Digital_DU032817.pdf

Operational Risk Management (ASCI 638, 7.5)

Several operational risk assessment (ORM) tools were developed to assist commercial operators using the DJI Phantom 3 Professional small Unmanned Aerial System (sUAS), in accordance with Chapter 8 of Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Marshall, Barnhart, Shappee, Most, 2016). The Annex, derived from MIL-STD-882D/E, was used for example probability, severity, and risk levels using the “Fleet/Inventory” columns. First, the Preliminary Hazard List and Analysis was created, which is a first look at the hazards an operation might be exposed to. It was populated with hazards that have historically plagued small UAS such as high winds, electromagnetic interference, and hardware/software malfunction. Given the current public perception of “drones,” mishaps involving injury to non-participants was given the most serious rating. Next, the Operational Hazard Review and Analysis was drafted to incorporate changes from review boards, flight test experience, or operational lessons-learned. Three notional “review actions” were noted based on the author’s expectation of reasonable “near misses.” For example, taking off in high winds may still cause damage from propeller strikes. Given that the autopilot can correct for wind gusts much faster than a human, use of auto-takeoff and landing was directed for wind speeds over 15 knots. These tools should help commercial sUAS users appropriately characterize risks prior to flight, and seek guidance from supervisors and key leadership.

References

DJI. (2016). Phantom 3 Professional User Guide. Retrieved from http://www.dji.com

Marshall, D. M., Barnhart, R. K., Shappee, E., & Most, M. (2016). Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems. Boca Raton: Taylor & Francis, CRC Press.

Automatic Takeoff and Landing (ASCI 638, 6.6)

Automatic takeoff and landing systems (ATLS) have been under development for decades as a natural progression of the instrument approach. An auto-land capability is typically found in commercial aviation as a means of satisfying the requirements for Approach Category IIIb minimums under Advisory Circular 120-28D, which allow approaches with a decision height of zero and runway visual range of 150 feet (FAA, 1999). These include a suite of sensors and systems that demonstrate the “fail operational” concept, which can be satisfied by a single system with dual-redundant components, or two independent systems with redundant components. Pilots must also satisfy lengthy requirements for initial qualification and currency, featuring academics and simulator events. While several enabling technologies have enhanced the accuracy of ground movement, the manned aircraft community has not shown significant interest in automatic takeoff systems. In the Unmanned aerial system (UAS) market, ATLS has been fielded as a means to reduce mishaps stemming from pilot error in close proximity to the ground. Takeoff systems are typically a simple stabilization after a catapult or vertical launch (Marshall, Barnhart, Shappee, & Most, 2016). Landings systems range from simple guidance to an arresting apparatus, to a complex replication of a conventional runway recovery. In contrast to CAT III requirements, UAS ATLS does not currently require any additional aircraft certification or airman rating. The following paper will review the state of the art for manned and unmanned aircraft ATLS integration.

Manned Aircraft: DA 50/52

The Diamond Aircraft Consortium is developing an automatic landing system for light general aviation aircraft, advertising that its DA50 and 52 will be first to enter the market with this capability at the $100,000 price point (Marsh, 2012). Garmin has also been working towards a similar capability with its G3X autopilot for the sport and kit plane markets (Garmin, 2017). While details of both systems are scarce, they are highly likely to rely on Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS), as light aircraft do not typically have radar/laser altimeters, auto-throttles, auto-braking/anti-skid, and are unable to demonstrate the reliability required in AC 120-28D. Diamond and Garmin understand this, and are instead marketing their auto-land systems as a safety-enhancing contingency feature should the pilot become incapable of landing, but without the destructive effects of an airframe recovery parachute. While not certified for approaches below Category I, general aviation pilots are also expecting this new technology to assist with single pilot operations under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR), reducing workload and increasing safety (SportPilotTalk, 2015).

Figure 1. Diamond DA-52 auto-landing test platform. Reprinted from Airplane Owners and Pilots Association (2016).

Unmanned Aircraft: Kingfisher II

The Intelligent Landing System (ILS) is a novel creation of BAE Systems-Australia that is installed on the medium altitude/long endurance Kingfisher II for test purposes (Williams & Crump, 2012). Many UAS rely on teleoperation for takeoff and landing phases, which requires crews and control stations, and limits operations to/from locations that were planned for well in advance. ATLS for fixed-wing UAS has been fielded on a few aircraft like the MQ-1C or RQ-5, although these tend to rely on Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS) or other unique active systems that reduce, but not eliminate the logistics footprint. Another typical requirement is that the runway, taxiways, and parking areas be surveyed to generate a digital model from which the aircraft can estimate its position. The goal of ILS is to enable ad hoc takeoff and landing, without pre-staged equipment or surveys. The key is closed-loop image processing onboard the vehicle and makes two assumptions: the vehicle carries a gimbaled optical sensor, and the runway has standard Precision Instrument Runway Markings. ILS is given direct control over sensor orientation and zoom to automatically search for and characterize the designated runway. Image frames are adjusted for camera lens distortion and each pixel is transformed from the image reference frame to the aircraft reference frame. During flight tests, a pilot was positioned at the field with a standard Kingfisher II control station and “kill switch” to decouple ILS from the controls, although they were never required to intervene. At this early developmental stage, ILS does not have any fail-safe or redundant backup, and would be completely inoperative should the gimbaled sensor fail. This would have to be addressed if the system was ever to see wide-spread use as the primary landing method as opposed to a contingency method (in response to an engine failure for example). As with any new system, pilots would need to be trained on normal and emergency operations. In the case of long-range UAS that have typically divided pilots between terminal and mission phases, all pilots would need to demonstrate acceptable skills for near-aerodrome operations. Additionally, ILS was demonstrated on the relatively benign, 275lb Kingfisher II. Should it be installed on a larger UAS, it will likely need to be fused with precision altitude data such as that provided by a radar altimeter to appropriately manage vertical velocity and the flare.

Figure 2. Example of ILS automatic runway detection using the Precision Instrument Runway Markings as a reference. Reprinted from Intelligent Landing System for Landing UAVs at Unsurveyed Fields, 2012.

Conclusion

This short essay has researched and summarized the current state of ATLS systems as they apply to manned and unmanned aircraft. New developments in the general aviation field were identified as a way to reduce pilot workload and increase safety. ATLS for UAS is continuing to progress towards less onboard equipment so that lighter vehicles can have this capability.

References

Euronews. (2012, November 29). Small aircraft, smart safety. Retrieved from http://www.euronews.com/2012/11/28/small-aircraft-smart-safety

Federal Aviation Administration. (1999). AC-120-28D: Criteria for Approval of Category III Weather Minima for Takeoff, Landing, and Rollout. Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC120-28D.pdf

Garmin. (2017). G3X™. Retrieved from http://www.garmin.com/us/products/intheair/sport-aviation/g3x/

General Atomics. (2017). Gray Eagle UAS. Retrieved from http://www.ga-asi.com/gray-eagle

Marsh, A. (2012, December 19). Diamond to offer auto landing in 2016. Retrieved from https://www.aopa.org/news-and-media/all-news/2012/december/19/diamond-to-offer-auto-landing-in-2016

Marshall, D. M., Barnhart, R. K., Shappee, E., & Most, M. (2016). Introduction to unmanned aircraft systems. Boca Raton: Taylor & Francis, CRC Press.

Sport Pilot Talk. (2015). Tl 3000 & Garmin G3X = Fully Automated Landing Approach. Retrieved from http://sportpilottalk.com/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=3790

Williams, P., & Crump, M. (2012). Intelligent Landing System for Landing UAVs at Unsurveyed Fields. 18th International Congress of the Aeronautical Sciences. Retrieved from http://www.icas.org/ICAS_ARCHIVE/ICAS2012/PAPERS/131.PDF