This short essay will review some of the leading human factors, ethical and moral considerations for employing Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) in a combat role, and compare and contrast them to manned aircraft. The topics are complex and any one of these areas is worthy of a dissertation.
Human Factors
Like any other complex mission for UAS, remote warfare is limited by the system’s ability to provide enough information in the Ground Control Station (GCS) for the pilot to decisions. The military UAS pilot is challenged to maintain situational awareness of the battlefield due to narrow fields of view, lack of non-visual sensory inputs, and poorly designed interfaces that invite mistakes (Cooke, Pringle, Pedersen, Connor, & Salas, 2006). The lack of human-centric GCS design in tactical UAS can potentially be traced to the origins of the companies that built them, and the speed at which the military acquired them. In the case of the MQ-1 Predator, General Atomics did not have significant experience in building aircraft or cockpits (Whittle, 2015). Combined with the Air Force’s explosive demand for Full-Motion Video (FMV) at the start of the “War on Terror,” the result was a GCS frozen in a highly developmental, non-standard state. While significant research has been accomplished over the past two decades to improve visual displays, and add aural and haptic displays, a materiel solution has yet to be fielded.
Ethics and Morals of Remote Warfare
According to EthicsDefined.org, morals are the “sense of right and wrong” that are culturally or religiously motivated (2016). In some populations, the idea that only one side of an armed conflict can hold the other at risk may be immoral, and Freidberger, (2013) has suggested that this idea has caused outrage against “drone strikes” among people in Afghanistan and Iraq. As reinforcement he cites a statement by former Army General Stanley McChrystal that unmanned strikes are “hated on a visceral level,” but is this necessarily tied to the unmanned aspect. Armed UAS provide unparalleled persistent surveillance with the ability to strike as soon as soon as a targeting opportunity arises, which has likely resulted in more attempted strikes during the Global War on Terror. However, if a platform had been designed that enabled the same capability, plus 24 hours of life support for a crew and countermeasure systems, how would the results be different? America is still holding the enemy at risk without significant threats to safety. Ethics are timeless rules that are essentially recognized by all, which Freidberger investigates using the Just War theory. In doing this, he takes issue with President Obama’s justification for the use of force and illuminates the real heart of the issue. Since Global War on Terror strike justifications, rules of engagement, and combat UAS were all fielded at approximately the same time, many people group them together and see UAS negatively. Further, when people are ignorant to the technical aspects of UAS, and do not research the matter, they arrive at unreasonable conclusions. For example, O’Connell (2010) references a “computer” that tells UAS crews when a weapon has just been fired, and they employ weapons solely on that assessment. She is likely referring to the infrared signature of a hot rifle, which when combined with a crew member’s personal experience and training, results in the correct assessment that the rifle was recently fired. This is no different from an observation made with an infrared sensor on a guard tower, tank, or manned aircraft. What many articles against “remote warfare” consider is that the UAS is a natural continuance of humans creating weapons with more standoff, much like the spear, catapult, and cruise missile.
Conclusion
This essay has skimmed the wave tops of the controversial issue of armed UAS. Several human factors issues were highlighted, showing that there is significant room for improvement. On the non-technical side, the ethical and moral implications of armed UAS were investigated, and found to be dependent on the culture and laws of the using nation.
References
Cooke, N., Pringle, H., Pedersen, H., Connor, O., & Salas, E. (2006). Human Factors of Remotely Operated Vehicles. Advances in Human Performance and Cognitive Engineering Research Human Factors of Remotely Operated Vehicles, 7, 1-1. doi:10.1016/s1479-3601(05)07031-1
Ethicsdefined.org. (2014, March 14). Morals vs. Ethics. Retrieved from http://www.ethicsdefined.org/what-is-ethics/morals-vs-ethics/
Freiberger, E. (2013). Just War Theory and the Ethics of Drone Warfare. Retrieved from http://www.e-ir.info/2013/07/18/just-war-theory-and-the-ethics-of-drone-warfare/
Whittle, R. (2015). Predator: The Secret Origins of the Drone Revolution. New York: Picador USA.
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